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Abstract 
This  article  addresses  the  question  of  the  coherence  of  enactivism  as 
a research perspective by making a case study of enactivism in mathematics 
education research. Main theoretical directions in mathematics education are 
reviewed  and  the  history  of  adoption  of  concepts  from  enactivism  is 
described. It is concluded that enactivism offers a ‘grand theory’ that can be 
brought  to  bear  on  most  of  the  phenomena  of  interest  in  mathematics 
education research, and so it provides a sufficient theoretical framework. It 
has particular strength in describing interactions between cognitive systems, 
including  human  beings,  human  conversations  and  larger  human  social 
systems.  Some  apparent  incoherencies  of  enactivism  in  mathematics 
education and in other fields come from the adoption of parts of enactivism 
that are then grafted onto incompatible theories. However, another significant 
source of incoherence is the inadequacy of Maturana’s definition of a social 
system and the lack of a generally agreed upon alternative. 
Keywords: enactivism; biology of cognition; mathematics education; theories 
of learning; autopoiesis; cognitive systems; social systems. 
Introduction 
Is enactivism a coherent and promising research perspective? Is it a conce-
ption, or maybe a framework for research? What is its future? In this article 
I will  address these questions by making a  case study  of  enactivism  in  my 
field,  which  is  mathematics  education  research.  I  will  review  the  main 
theoretical directions in mathematics education and the history of adoption of 
concepts  from  enactivism.  I  will  consider  whether  enactivism  provides 
a sufficient theoretical framework for research in mathematics education and 
whether enactivism is coherent in general.  
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What is Enactivism? 
Enactivism exists in the eyes of observers, and so any discussion of it must 
begin with a description of the authors’ observations. For me enactivism is 
fundamentally  a  theory  about  autopoietic  systems  and  the  biology  of 
cognition.  My  first  encounter  with  it  was  Tree  of  Knowledge  (Maturana 
& Varela 1987) and I read backwards and forwards from there. Maturana’s 
writing has been more significant to me than Varela’s, especially ‘Everything 
said  is  said  by  an  observer’  (Maturana  1987)  and  ‘Reality:  The  search  for 
objectivity or the quest for a compelling argument’ (Maturana 1988). Hence, 
when I write about enactivism I am thinking of the ideas of Maturana and 
Varela  up  to  and  including  Tree  of  Knowledge,  plus  material  from  The 
Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991) and later writing as far as it 
overlaps  with  Varela’s  prior  work  with  Maturana.  There  are  clearly  many 
connections  between  enactivism  and  the  work  of  Bateson,  McCullogh,  von 
Foerster  and  Lakoff,  for  example,  but  I  do  not  see  their  work  as  defining 
enactivism itself.  
I realise this reading of enactivism will only overlap and not coincide with 
that of many readers. After all, the words ‘enaction’ and ‘enactive’ were used 
first by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) and Maturana never uses them, so 
my emphasis on Maturana’s ideas may seem odd. And I am also paying little 
attention  to  Varela’s  later  elaborations  of  enaction  and  the  connections  he 
makes  to  the  phenomenology  of  Merleau-Ponty  and  Buddhist  mindful-
ness/awareness practice. On the other hand, the description of ena-ction in 
The Embodied Mind depends on a number of concepts, such as embodiment, 
perceptually  guided  action,  recurrent  sensorimotor  patterns,  structure  deter-
minism  and  operational  closure,  that  were  developed  during  Varela’s  work 
with  Maturana  in  the  early  1970s,  and  first  described  in  many  joint  and 
individual  publications,  most  notably  Autopoiesis  and  Cognition  (Maturana 
and Varela 1980a) and Tree of Knowledge. And most importantly, the key isight 
of enactivism, it seems to me, is the founding of cognition in biology, and that 
insight is best reflected in the collaborative work of Maturana and Varela and 
Maturana’s work since then.  
 
Theoretical frameworks in mathematics education 
Enactivism was introduced into mathematics education at a time when the 
main  theoretical  debate  concerned  how  to  describe  the  social  interactions 
between individuals.  
Two general theoretical positions on the relationship between social processes 
and psychological development can be identified in the current literature. These 
positions frequently appear to be in direct opposition in that one gives priority AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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to  social  and cultural  processes,  and  the  other  to  the individual autonomous 
learner. (Cobb & Bauersfeld 1995: 3) 
Psychological theories, giving priority to the individual autonomous learner, 
entered mathematics  education at  its  very beginning  as  an  academic field. 
Sociocultural  theories  came  much  later,  and  their  introduction  created 
significant tension.  
Mathematicians had taught mathematics and written mathematics textbooks 
for  millennia  before  mathematics  education  emerged  as  an  academic 
discipline.  A  possible  marker  of  its  origin  is  the  first  issue  of  the  journal 
L’Enseignement  Mathématique  in  1899,  which  included  both  an  article  on 
mathematics teaching by the famous mathematician Henri Poincaré, as well 
an  article  on  “scientific  pedagogy”  by  Alfred  Binet,  the  director  of  the 
Laboratory of Experimental Psychology at the Sorbonne (Kilpatrick 1992: 7). 
This  bringing  together  of  mathematics  and  psychology  established  the 
theoretical basis for the field of mathematics education.  
After its birth as an academic field at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the  further  development  of  mathematics  education  was  disrupted  by  the 
interruption  of  international collaborations  caused  by  the  two world  wars. 
After the post war recovery, the field was revitalised by the introduction of the 
genetic epistemology of the psychologist Jean Piaget (1896-1980, a student of 
Binet). This became the dominant theoretical framework for the rest of the 
century. The founding fathers of mathematics education from this time, Zoltan 
Dienes  (1916-2014),  Ephraim  Fischbein  (1920-1998),  Caleb  Gattegno  (1911-
1988)  and Richard  Skemp (1919-1995)  all  trained  as both  mathematics and 
psychologists,  except  Gattegno  who  collaborated  directly  with  Piaget.  The 
importance  of  psychology  in  mathematics  education  is  also  marked by  the 
founding  in  1976  of  the  International  Group  for  the  Psychology  of 
Mathematics Education, whose annual conference became the main research 
conference in the field.  
Even  at  this  time,  however,  there  was  a  recognition  that  mathematics 
education  must  also  consider  the  contexts  in  which  learning  takes  place. 
Heinrich Bauersfeld recalls: 
From  the  very  beginning  [of  PME]  I  was  unhappy  with  the  exclusive 
concentration on Psychology only, which meant focusing on the individual and 
neglecting  the  social  dimensions  of  the  complex  teaching-learning  processes. 
Research  on  the  complex  problems  of  learning/teaching-processes  and  of 
teaching teachers to teach mathematics will not arrive at helpful constructive 
information as long as such vast domains as language, human interaction (not 
the  usual  psychological  interaction  of  variables!)  and  rich  case  studies  are 
neglected and/or treated by inadequate research methods. (Nicol et al. 2008).  
By the 1980s “Researchers were taking the social and cultural dimensions of 
mathematics education more seriously (Kilpatrick 1992: 30). This meant that The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research 
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the  theories  of  psychology  had  to  be  supplemented  both  by  teachers’ 
experiences  and  by  theories  from  other  disciplines.  “Practitioners  were 
increasingly  becoming  members  of  the  interdisciplinary  groups  needed  to 
help  research  link  the  complexity of  practice  to theoretical constructs.  The 
techniques and concepts used by anthropologists, sociologists, linguists and 
philosophers proved helpful in that task” (Kilpatrick 1992: 31).  
However, as I will discuss below, sociocultural theories did not fit easily into 
a field dominated by psychological perspectives, and as indicated in the Cobb 
and  Bauersfeld  quotation  above,  the  two  approaches  often  seemed  to  be 
opposed.  Researchers  in  both  camps  critiqued  the  perceived  failings  of 
theories  used  by  the  others.  This  was  the  context  in  which  concepts  from 
enactivism first entered mathematics education. 
 
Enactivist ideas in mathematics education 
In  mathematics  education  the  growing  influence  of  enactivist  ideas can be 
traced historically through references to the work of Maturana and Varela. 
Enactivist ideas have been introduced into mathematics education four times. 
The  first  references  come  from  radical  constructivists  who  sought  to 
incorporate the concept of consensual domains in order to address criticisms 
that radical constructivism did not address learning in social situations. Tom 
Kieren’s work then introduced the full range of enactivist concepts, and he 
was the first to use the work ‘enactivist’ to describe his research. At about the 
same time, the concept of embodied cognition began to be used by a number 
of  other  researchers  with  interests  in  bodily  metaphors  and  gestures  in 
mathematics.  Finally,  the  concept  of  autopoiesis,  as  reframed  by  Niklas 
Luhmann,  has  been  used  by  Heinz  Steinbring  to  describe  interactions  in 
mathematics classrooms.  
 
Radical constructivism and consensual domains 
The first influence of enactivism (prior to the coining of the term) came from 
an attempt to integrate social elements into the radical constructivism of Ernst 
von  Glasersfeld.  In  the  late  1980s,  Paul  Cobb  (a  graduate  student  of  von 
Glasersfeld’s collaborator Les Steffe) began to refer to Maturana’s concept of 
consensual domain (1980b, 1978a) in order to describe a world view or belief 
system shared by many individuals (see e.g., Cobb 1985, 1986). Von Glasersfeld 
(1989) himself also refers to Maturana (1980a) to account for the possibility of 
communication between individuals, which arises “in the course of protracted 
interaction,  through  mutual  orientation  and  adaptation”  (Glasersfeld  1989: 
132). This led to Maturana’s work being seen as a part or a type of radical 
constructivism. For example, Konold & Johnson refer to “the radical construc-AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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tivism  of  Maturana  and  von  Glasersfeld”  (1991:  10)  and  Krainer  includes 
Maturana on a list of those putting forth “constructivist positions” along with 
Piaget and von Glasersfeld (1993: 69). 
Critics often claimed that radical constructivism was unable to explain social 
phenomena (Ernest 2010: 41), and Maturana’s concepts of consensual domain, 
domain  of  interpretation,  isomorphic  structures  and  mutual  adaptation 
continue  to  be  used  by  radical  constructivists  to  address  this  criticism 
(e.g.,Thompson 2008). However, though von Glasersfeld and Maturana were 
friends,  they  disagreed  on  some  fundamental  points,  such  as  structure 
determinism and the system’s environment (Glasersfeld 1991, Kenny 2007). 
The radical constructivists, thought they were the first to apply Maturana’s 
ideas in mathematics education, cannot be said to be using enactivism, as they 
pick  and  choose  concepts,  seeking  those  that  give  radical  constructivism 
a language to describe social phenomena.  
 
Tom Kieren 
Tom Kieren has been described as “one of a very few pioneers of enactivism 
within the mathematics education community” (Kieren & Simmt 2009: 28). In 
the  mid  1980s  he  picked up Autopoiesis  and  Cognition  (Maturana  &  Varela 
1980)  and  was  strongly  influenced  by  what  he  read.  He  also  encountered 
enactivist concepts through a paper Maturana delivered with Karl Tomm at 
a conference of the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Calgary, on 
“Languaging and the emotion flow” in 1986 and through Tree of Knowledge 
(Maturana & Varela 1987). Kieren was already well acquainted with radical 
constructivism, but found something new and exciting in Maturana’s ideas. In 
1988 he discussed this work with his colleague Susan Pirie and this led to the 
first  publication  in  mathematics  education  that  makes  extensive  use  of 
Maturana’s ideas, Pirie and Kieren (1989). They use the concepts of recursion 
in knowing, knowing as effective action as seen by an observer, autopoiesis, 
consensual coordination of action, and the aphorism “everything said is said 
by an observer” as the basis for a theory of mathematical understanding that 
has come to be known as the Pirie-Kieren model.  
In 1994 Kieren published a reaction to two papers by radical constructivists in 
the  Journal  of  Research  in  Childhood  Education.  In  it  he  uses  the  word 
“enactivist”  for  the  first  time  in  the  mathematics  education  literature;  the 
word was coined in The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991). 
Kieren (1994) describes enactivism as a position on cognition that includes the 
concepts  of  structure  determinism,  structural  coupling,  bringing  forth 
a world, observer dependence, satisficing, and co-emergence. 
In the 1990s Kieren supervised a number of graduate students who went on to 
use  enactivist  ideas  in  their work.  These  include  Judy  Barnes,  Brent  Davis, The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research 
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Lynn Gordon Calvert, Elaine Simmt, and myself. Almost all include in their 
doctoral dissertations extensive descriptions of enactivist ideas (Barnes 1994; 
Davis 1994; Gordon Calvert 1999; Reid 1995; Simmt 2000).  
Of these graduate students, Davis has published the most extensively and has 
done  much  to  spread  enactivist  ideas  to  the  mathematics  education 
community. His doctoral dissertation (1994) was the basis for his first book 
(1996),  in  which  enactivist  ideas  are  presented  in  detail.  He  places  special 
emphasis  on  enactivism’s  denial  of  the  mind/body  split,  and  the  enti-
ty/environment split (1996: 77). He also refers to autopoiesis, co-emergence, 
embodied cognition, double embodiment, knowing as being and doing, and 
structure-determinism. Davis also published several related journal articles 
(Davis  1995,  1997;  Davis,  Sumara  &  Kieren  1996)  in  which  he  provides 
descriptions  of  enactivism  as  an  interpretive  framework.  For  mathematics 
education  researchers  such  as  Begg  (1999,  2002,  2013)  and  Samson  and 
Schafer (2010, 2011, 2012), Davis is a primary reference for enactivist theory. 
However,  Davis  himself  later  came  to  regard  enactivism  as  a  variety  of 
complexity  science,  and  changed  his  focus  to  applications  of  complexity 
science  in  general  to  educational  research  (see,  e.g.,  Davis  2004,  Davis 
& Sumara 2006).  
Three  other  doctoral  students,  Elaine  Simmt,  Lynn  Gordon  Calvert,  and 
myself,  along  with  Kieren  constituted the  Enactivist  Research  Group at  the 
University  of  Alberta.  Together  we  presented  enactivism  informed 
interpretations of shared data from four perspectives (Gordon Calvert, Kieren, 
Reid  &  Simmt  1995;  Kieren,  Gordon  Calvert,  Reid  &  Simmt  1995;  Kieren, 
Simmt, Gordon Calvert, & Reid 1996). Key concepts used in those presentations 
were  coemergence,  structural  determinism,  autopoiesis,  and  double 
embodiment, and enactivism provided not only the interpretative frame but 
also the methodology.  
Both  Simmt  and  Gordon  Calvert  became  professors  at  the  University  of 
Alberta, and doctoral work with an enactivist framework continues to be done 
there. The research of Joyce Mgombelo, Immaculate Namukasa, Jerome Proulx 
and Martina Metz at the University of Alberta has continued the enactivist 
tradition begun by Tom Kieren.  
 
The Bristol School 
After  completing  my  dissertation  (Reid  1995)  I  continued  to  make  use  of 
a wide range of enactivist ideas, especially Maturana’s (1988) concept of an 
emotional  orientation,  in  my  research  on  the  development  of  students’ 
reasoning  towards  mathematical  proof  (see,  e.g.,  Blackmore,  Cluett,  &  Reid 
1996, Reid 1996, 1999, 2002ab; Reid & Drodge 2000). Enactivism continues to AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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provide  the  methodological  underpinnings  of  my  research  into  teachers’ 
pedagogies (see http://www.acadiau.ca/~dreid/OT/).  
In 1995 I met Laurinda Brown in a PME discussion group organised by Rafael 
Núñez and Laurie Edwards (see below). Brown had been using the work of 
Gregory Bateson (1972, 1979) extensively but had not discovered Maturana 
and Varela. I had not yet read Bateson’s work. After exchanging reading lists, 
we began a long collaboration. With our colleagues Vicki Zack and Alf Coles 
we made use of enactivism as a theoretical framework, and also incorporated 
Bateson’s  work and  later  the  work of Antonio  Damasio (1994).  His somatic 
marker  hypothesis  provided  us  with  a  neurological  explanation  for 
phenomena described by Maturana and Bateson (see, e.g., Brown & Reid 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2006; Brown, Reid & Coles 2003; Reid & Brown 1999; Reid, Brown, 
& Coles 2001).  
Brown introduced a number of graduate students to enactivist ideas, and two 
in  particular  picked  them  up  and  used  them  extensively.  Maria  Lozano 
completed her dissertation in 2004. She examined algebraic learning in the 
transition  from  arithmetic  to  algebra,  using  enactivism  as  both  her 
methodology and theoretical framework (Lozano 2004). Alf Coles collaborated 
with Brown over many years, on research and publications (e.g., Brown and 
Coles  1997,  2000,  2008,  2010)  that  “adopted  an  enactivist  epistemology  and 
methodology”  (Coles  2011:  18).  In  his  doctoral  dissertation  (Coles  2011)  he 
examined the patterns of communication in classrooms and teacher meetings 
from an explicitly enactivist perspective.  
 
Embodied mathematics 
The year 1995 can be seen as the birth year of another important theoretical 
framework  in  mathematics  education,  closely  related  but  not  identical  to 
enactivism. In that year Stephen Campbell and A. J. Dawson published a paper 
on ‘Learning as Embodied Action’ (Campbell & Dawson 1995) which draws 
strongly  on  The  Embodied  Mind  (Varela,  Thompson  &  Rosch  1991).  Rafael 
Núñez and Laurie Edwards in the same year presented a paper (Edwards & 
Núñez  1995)  and  organised  a  discussion  group  at  PME  on  non-objectivist 
cognitive science (Núñez & Edwards 1995), drawing heavily on The Embodied 
Mind as well as the work of Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) on body based 
metaphors in cognition. Since then embodied mathematics has emerged as 
a significant  theoretical  frame  in  mathematics  education.  It  posits  that  all 
human cognition  is  embodied,  that  is  “every  subjective  sensation,  memory, 
thought,  and  emotion—anything  at  all  that  any  human  being  can  ever 
experience—is  in  principle  enacted  in  some  objective,  observable,  way  as 
embodied behaviour.” (Campbell 2010: 313). Three threads can be discerned 
within the theoretical framework of embodied mathematics.  The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research 
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One  thread,  which  Campbell  (2010)  calls  ‘mathematics  educational 
neuroscience’, seeks to investigate mathematics learning using neuroscientific 
tools such as eye-tracking and brain scans. In this thread the ideas of Varela 
serve  chiefly  as a  starting  point  to justify  examining  cognition  in  terms  of 
observable bodily changes.  
A second thread builds chiefly on the work of Lakoff. A basic text is Where 
mathematics  comes  from:  How  the  embodied  mind  brings  mathematics  into 
being (Lakoff & Núñez 2000) in which they argue that mathematical concepts, 
even quite abstract concepts, are always based on bodily experiences, through 
metaphors.  Researchers  (e.g.,  Ferrara  2003;  Oehrtman  2003)  study  the 
metaphors  involved  in  students’  understandings  of  mathematical  concepts 
such as functions, limits, and sets. No reference is made to the work of Varela, 
except indirectly through references to publications of Edwards and Núñez.  
A third thread focusses on the use of gestures in mathematics education. This 
thread can be represented by a special issue of the journal Educational Studies 
in  Mathematics,  (Radford,  Edwards  &  Arzarello  2009)  in  which  embodied 
mathematics  is  used  in combination  with semiotics  to  research  the  role  of 
gestures in mathematical thinking and communication. In this work Varela’s 
ideas  play  a  limited  role,  acting  mainly  as  a  reference  for  the  concept  of 
embodied cognition.  
As  noted  above,  the  theoretical  framework  of  embodied  mathematics  is 
related  to  enactivism,  but  distinct  from  it.  The  Embodied  Mind  (Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch 1991) is a key reference for this school of research, but 
other work by Varela is rarely cited, and work by Maturana is almost never 
cited by researchers in the area.  
 
Autopoietic social systems 
The enactivist idea of autopoiesis found its way into mathematics education 
through one other channel, the sociological work of Nicholas Luhmann, which 
was applied to mathematics education by Heinz Steinbring. Luhmann (1986, 
1995,  1997)  considers  social  communication  to  be  an  example  of  an 
autopoietic system.  In  order  to  do so he generalises  Maturana’s concept  of 
autopoiesis  to  apply  to  non-living  systems  that  also  have  the  properties  of 
being self-organising and operationally closed. Within this broader conception 
of  autopoietic  systems  he  identifies  three  types:  living  systems,  psychic 
systems  and  social  systems.  The  elements  of  psychic  and  social  systems 
are   not   physical  but  based  on  meaning,  in  consciousness  and  commu-
nication respectively. AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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The relationship between psychic conscious mental and social communication 
systems is an important theme in Luhmann’s work, and in its application to 
mathematics education.  
Communication systems and mental systems (or consciousness) form two clearly 
separated  autopoietic  domains....  These  two  kinds  of  systems  are,  however, 
closely connected to each other in a particular tight relation and mutually form 
a  ‘portion  of  a  necessary  environment’:  Without  the  participation  of 
consciousness systems there is no communication, and without the participation 
in communication, there is no development of the consciousness. (Baraldi et al. 
1997: 86, translated by Steinbring 2005:320) 
Steinbring uses  Luhmann’s  concept autopoietic social  systems  composed of 
communications  to  analyse  episodes  in  mathematics  teaching  (see,  e.g., 
1999, 2005).  This  approach  has  had  only  a  limited  influence  in  mathema-
tics education. 
 
Summing up 
Enactivism  has  become  recognised  as  a  theoretical  framework  used  in 
mathematics education, and it is interesting to see how it has been summa-
rised by overviews of theories in the field.  
Mason and Johnston-Wilder include enactivism in the Fundamental Constructs 
in Mathematics Education (2004). Key concepts cited are ‘action is knowledge 
and knowledge is action” and ‘everything said is said by an observer.’ The 
enactivist idea of ‘bringing forth a world’ is seen as “entirely compatible with 
von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism” (Mason & Johnston-Wilder 2004: 71), 
and radical constructivists such as Cobb, Yackel and Wood are described as 
having “taken up the enactivist view” (Mason & Johnston-Wilder 2004: 72). 
The work of Campbell and Dawson (1995) is cited a particular example of the 
enactivist approach, with the idea of stressing and ignoring being presented as 
central. Much of Mason and Johnston-Wilder’s summary seems to have been 
based on Campbell and Dawson’s article, which appeared in a book edited by 
Mason. The body of work inspired by Tom Kieren is represented by a brief 
quotation from Davis, Sumara and Kieren (1996) which is seen as exemplary 
of “radical enactivism” (Mason & Johnston-Wilder 2004: 73), in which learning 
and action are identified.  
In  the  recent  collection  Theories  of  Mathematics  Education  (Sriraman 
& English 2010) Paul Ernest contrasts four “philosophies of learning”: ‘simple’ 
constructivism, radical constructivism, enactivism and social constructivism. 
Ernest (2010) cites The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991) as 
the  original  influence  that  brought  enactivism  into  mathematics  education 
and he lists autopoiesis and cognition-as-enaction as key concepts. He cites 
Lakoff and Johnson’s work, as transmitted by Lakoff and Núñez, as a “source The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research 
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of  enactivism”  (Ernest  2010:  42).  Ernest  sees  enactivism  as  “not  so  very 
different  from  Piaget’s  epistemology  and  learning  theory  and  the  radical 
constructivism to which it gave birth” (2010: 42). What Ernest sees are distinct 
in enactivism is the role of metaphor contributed by Lakoff. This suggests that 
it is the embodied mathematics research that has been Ernest’s main source of 
information about enactivism. Another clue to this is his comment “What both 
enactivism and radical constructivism appear to share is the subordination of 
the social or the interpersonal dimension” (2010: 43).  
 
Mathematics: Mind or Society? 
Recall  that  when  enactivist  ideas  were  first  introduced  into  mathematics 
education a fundamental tension existed between psychological theories or 
sociocultural theories. This tension was addressed in mathematics education 
in a number of ways.  
As noted above, radical constructivists borrowed Maturana’s concept of con-
sensual domain in order to be able to address social aspects of learning. The 
concept  of  consensual  domain  was  only  referred  to,  however,  and  the  full 
implications  of  incorporating  the  concept  into  radical  constructivism  were 
never,  as  far  as  I  know,  worked  out.  Given  the  fundamental  ontological 
differences  between  radical  constructivism  and  enactivism,  it  may  not  be 
possible  to  truly  integrate  the  concept  of  consensual  domain  into  radical 
constructivism. Adopting the concept of consensual domains without adopting 
the ontological basis for their existence would give rise to an incoherence in 
radical  constructivism.  This  can  only  be  resolved  by  either  adopting 
Maturana’s  position  on  reality  (effectively  changing  radical  constructivism 
into enactivism) or by dropping the concept of consensual domains, leaving 
radical  constructivism  again  open  to  the  critique  that  it  does  not  address 
learning in social contexts.  
Cobb  and  Bauersfeld  (1995)  take  a  different  approach,  of  employing  both 
a radical  constructivist  framework  as  well  the  interactionist  perspective 
developed by Bauersfeld (1980).  
We  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  psychological  and  sociological  perspectives 
each tell half of a good story. What was needed was a combined approach that 
takes  individual  students’  mathematical  interpretations  seriously  while 
simultaneously  seeing  their  activity  as  necessarily  socially  situated.  (Cobb 
& Bauersfeld 1995 p. ix) 
They  “seek  to  transcend  the  apparent  opposition  between  collectivism  and 
individualism  by  coordinating  sociological  analyses  of  the  microculture 
established by the classroom community with cognitive analyses of individual 
students’ constructive activities” (Cobb & Bauersfeld 1995: 7). However, they 
are explicit that “this coordination does not … produce a seamless theoretical AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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framework” (Cobb & Bauersfeld 1995: 8). It is a coordination of approaches, 
not a single combined approach.  
Instead,  the  resulting  orientation  is  analogous  to  Heisenberg’s  uncertainty 
principle.  When  the  focus  is  on  the  individual,  the  social  fades  into  the 
background, and vice versa. Further the emphasis given to one perspective or 
the other depends on the issues and purposes at hand. Thus … there is no simple 
unification of the perspectives. (Cobb & Bauersfeld 1995: 8) 
Another  approach  begins  with  a  sociocultural  perspective  and  attempts  to 
integrate psychological elements. The main example of this approach is social 
constructivism,  which  built  on  the  work  of  the  Belorussian  psychologist 
Vygotsky.  Partly  out  of  a  genuine  interest  in  how  thinking  is  related  to 
language and society, and partly because the political and intellectual context 
of the Soviet Union in the 1930s demanded a Marxist element in any theory, 
Vygotsky  developed a  theory that  pays  explicit attention  to how social  and 
cultural  patterns  of  interaction  shape  thinking.  Beginning  in  the  1970s 
Vygotsky’s  ideas were  adopted  in mathematics  education  as  an  alternative, 
called social constructivism, to Piagetian constructivism.  
Social constructivism, however, was critiqued as downplaying psychological 
processes in learning. This lead to efforts to create a more robust theory by 
adding  psychological  elements  from  Piagetian  constructivism  into  the 
sociocultural theories of Vygotsky. As an example, Confrey (1992) relates how 
Wertsch  (1985)  “proposes  that  Piaget  should  be  added  into  the  Vygotskian 
program” (Confrey 1992: 13) both in the description of “natural” development 
and in the process of construction of scientific concepts. This, Confrey notes, 
results “in major changes and contradictions in Vygotsky’s program” (1992: 
13). This she sees as a general problem with any effort to integrate radical 
constructivist and sociocultural approaches by simple modifications of each 
theory.  
These shifts of attention  to include social  interaction and cultural influence  [in 
radical constructivism] imply deep reconceptualization of theory and methodology. 
An integrated theory will need to seek to reshape both theories to allow for both 
intra-cognitive and inter-cognitive activity. (Confrey 1992: 28) 
Instead, Confrey proposes that an alternative theory is needed, and she lists 
a number of possible characteristics of such a theory. In the published version 
of  her  text,  she  does  not  go  further  than  presenting  her  list.  Intriguingly, 
however,  Lerman  (1996)  in  summarising  her  paper, claims she  “argues for 
a new  approach  that  incorporates  Maturana  and  Varela’s  (1986)  theory  of 
autopoiesis” (Lerman 1996:141). It may be that she argued this when the paper 
was presented but not in the printed version.  
Later, enactivist researchers in mathematics education elaborated the ways in 
which  enactivism  in  fact  offers  a  new  approach  that  addresses  both  the 
individual and the social.  The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research 
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In sum, then, cognition does not occur in minds and brains, but in the possibility 
for (shared) action. Enactivism thus embraces the insights of constructivism, but 
does  not  privilege  the  individual  as  the  truth-determining  authority.  Similarly, 
enactivists  are  able  to  appreciate  the  social  constructivist’s  concern  for  the 
transcendent (i.e., beyond the individual) nature of knowledge, but do not frame 
collective  knowledge  in  opposition  to  subjective  knowing.  Truth  and  collective 
knowledge, for the enactivist, exist and consist in the possibility for joint or shared 
action—and  that,  necessarily,  is  larger  than  the  solitary  cognizing  agent. 
Enactivism thus offers a way of bringing these discourses into conversation; for 
example,  constructivism’s  subject  and  social  constructivism’s  collective  are 
regarded as self-similar forms. (Davis 1996:192-193) 
While the debates between those taking psychological approaches and those 
taking sociocultural approaches have largely died down, this is not due to the 
adoption  of  enactivism  as  an  alternative  theory,  as  (perhaps)  proposed  by 
Confrey. Rather, most mathematics educators have adopted something like the 
eclectic approach of Cobb and Bauersfeld, using elements of sociocultural and 
constructivist  theories  without  being  too  concerned  about  contradictions 
and coherence.  
It might be asked why enactivism has not been more widely adopted, if it does 
offer  a  way  to  address  both  the  individual  and  the  social  in  mathematics 
education. The difficult writing style of Maturana may be a factor, as might be 
the range of alternative conceptions of enactivism offered by others (e.g., Di 
Paolo, Rohde and De Jaegher 2010). No one has yet managed to capture the full 
complexity of enactivism as a biological theory of cognition in language that is 
more accessible than Maturana’s. The confusion around autopoiesis and social 
systems (explored below) may also be a factor. Many researchers in mathe-
matics education would like to be able to use a common frame to describe 
cognition  in  living  systems  and  social  systems,  and  this  has  resulted  in 
a number of approaches being taken that build on enactivist ideas while not 
treating  enactivism  as  the  full  framework  desired.  Examples  include 
Steinbring’s  adoption  of  Luhmann’s  version  of  autopoiesis,  and  Davis’ 
embracing  of  complexity  theory,  which  is  more  obviously  applicable  to 
complex dynamic systems of any order.  
 
Is enactivism in mathematics education sufficient? 
Within  mathematics  education  the  critiques  of  enactivism,  and  theoretical 
frameworks  in  general,  have  more  often  been  about  their  sufficiency  to 
address the phenomena of interest to mathematics educators than about their 
internal  consistency.  However,  the  two  issues  are  related.  As  Confrey’s 
comments above indicate there is a concern that any theory that is sufficient 
to address both individual learning and social interactions will be incoherent. 
In this section I will focus on the question of whether enactivism is sufficient AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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within  mathematics  education,  and  this  discussion  will  set  the  stage  for 
a consideration of whether enactivism is coherent.  
First it will be necessary to consider the nature of theories in mathematics 
education  from  two  perspectives.  Theories  in  mathematics  education  are 
examples  of  what  Bernstein  (2000)  calls  “horizontal  knowledge  structures” 
and they occur both as “grand” theories and as local theories. This establishes 
the context for the acceptance of enactivism as a theory and its limits when 
applied to mathematics education. I will then address critiques from within 
mathematics education concerning the sufficiency of enactivism in describing 
social systems.  
 
The knowledge structure of mathematics education 
As  Lerman  (2000)  points  out,  education  has  what  Bernstein  (2000)  calls 
a “horizontal  knowledge  structure.”  This  means  that  new  theories  in 
education tend to establish new research domains with their own language. 
They don’t replace other domains, as occurs in vertical knowledge structures 
like  physics,  where  heliocentrism  replaced  geocentrism  rather  than 
establishing a new research domain alongside it. In mathematics education 
a new  theory  like  embodied  mathematics  is  not  expected  to  replace  other 
theories,  taking  over  their  research  domains  and  transforming  them,  but 
rather  to  establish  a  new  research  domain.  While  proponents  of  any 
particular  theory would  like  to  think that  their  theory has  the  potential  to 
replace others, due to the horizontality of the knowledge structure this does 
not normally occur. 
Furthermore, education in general has a weak grammar; its theories are not 
able to produce unambiguous descriptions of phenomena. Objects of study in 
education,  such  as  cognition,  learning.  knowledge,  and  emotion, cannot  be 
defined  in  the  way  objects  of  study  in  physics  can  be.  They  are  instead 
described within the frame of reference of a theory. In order to learn what 
“cognition”  means  in  radical  constructivism  or  embodied  cognition  “one 
needs to learn the language of radical constructivism or embodied cognition” 
(Lerman 2000: 101).  
Lerman claims that theories in mathematics education are incommensurable, 
in principle.  
Where a constructivist might interpret a classroom transcript in terms of the 
possible  knowledge  construction  of  the  individual  participants,  viewing  the 
researcher’s  account  as  itself  a  construction  (Steffe  and  Thompson  2000), 
someone  using  socio-cultural  theory  might  draw  on  notions  of  a  zone  of 
proximal development. Constructivists might find that describing learning as an 
induction  into  mathematics,  as  taking  on  board  concepts  that  are  on  the 
intersubjective  plane,  incoherent  in  terms  of  the  theory  they  are  using  (and The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research 
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a similar description of the reverse can of course be given). In this sense, these 
parallel discourses are incommensurable. (Lerman 2010: 102) 
 
Grand and local theories 
In  mathematics  education  empirical  research  always  takes  place  with  two 
kinds of theories in play, grand theories and local or intermediate theories, 
frameworks and models (Ruthven, Laborde, Leach & Tiberghien 2009).  
“Grand theories” [are] theories general in scope and correspondingly abstract in 
form; notably theories of human development and learning, of the epistemology 
of  the  discipline,  or  of  the  process  of  instruction.  (Ruthven,  Laborde,  Leach 
& Tiberghien 2009: 330) 
Grand theories apply not only within mathematics education but to a much 
wider domain, and within mathematics education a grand theory is expected 
to  address  all  phenomena  of  interest.  Radical  constructivism,  sociocultural 
theory and enactivism are examples of grand theories (Simon 2013). They are 
expected  to  be  useful  in  describing  any  phenomenon  of  interest  in 
mathematics  teaching  and  learning,  either  directly,  or  in  some  cases  by 
providing a reasoned argument that the phenomenon in question does not 
exist. Transmission of knowledge is an example of a phenomenon that radical 
constructivism and enactivism would address by questioning and reframing 
rather than addressing directly.  
Local  theories,  on  the  other  hand,  are  applicable  only  within  mathematics 
education, and usually only within a small domain of mathematics education. 
For example, a theory describing how the principles of arithmetic might be 
abstracted to become theorems of algebra would be a local theory.  
If enactivism is a grand theory then it must address all phenomena of interest 
to mathematics educators. This includes individual learning, accounting for 
known phenomena such as the importance of physical materials in learning 
mathematics, the transition to abstract thinking, and the role of language. It 
also  includes  social  interactions,  including  phenomena  related  to  teacher 
student interactions, student student interactions, and interactions mediated 
by objects and symbols. Finally it includes the behaviours of social systems.  
 
Apparent insufficiencies of enactivism for mathematics education 
Enactivism has been critiqued as not dealing with social interactions, which 
are  undoubtedly  important  phenomena  in  mathematics  education.  For 
example, Ernest (2010) comments:  
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What  both  enactivism  and  radical  constructivism  appear  to  share  is  the 
subordination  of  the  social  or  the  interpersonal  dimension,  and  indeed  the 
existence  of  other  persons  to  constructions  and  perceived  regularities  in  the 
experienced  environment.  The  knowers’  own  body  might  be  a  given,  albeit 
emergent,  but  other  persons’  bodies  and  overall  beings  are  not.  Ironically, 
language,  which  is  the  primary  seat  of  metaphor,  is  the  quintessential  social 
construction. But language, like other persons, seems to be removed and exterior 
to the primary sources of knowledge of the enactive self in these perspectives. 
(Ernest 2010: 43) 
Ernest,  however,  seems  to be  referring not  to  enactivism,  but to  embodied 
mathematics. The claim that language and other persons are not central to 
enactivism is clearly wrong. In fact, recall that the first mathematics educators 
to  use  concepts  from  enactivism,  radical  constructivists,  were  interested 
precisely  in  ways  to  refer  to  social  phenomena.  This  seems  to  have  been 
forgotten. Perhaps this is a consequence of the way enactivist ideas have been 
adopted in mathematics education, usually as isolated concepts, grafted onto 
other theoretical frames. Radical constructivists have adopted the concept of 
a  consensual  domain,  and  the  concept  of  embodied  cognition  has  been 
employed by researchers interested in gesture, but neither group has actually 
adopted enactivism as a theoretical frame. This does not mean that enactivism 
itself  is  insufficient,  however,  only  that  the  way  it  has  been  employed  by 
radical constructivist and embodied mathematics researchers is insufficient.  
 
Social systems 
Ernest’s  critique  above  does  point  out  that  it  is  essential  to  address  social 
aspects of learning in mathematics education. This must be done at two levels, 
the interpersonal and the social. The interpersonal level includes the social 
interactions  and  language  use  of  teacher  and  students.  The  social  level 
concerns  the  behaviour  and  function  of  social  systems,  such  as  schools, 
nations  and  cultures.  While  enactivism  undeniably  addresses  the  social 
interactions and language use of living systems, it could be critiqued as being 
unable  to  address  the  functioning  of  non-living  social  systems.  Before 
responding  to  this  critique  it  is  worth  recalling  two  approaches  related  to 
enactivism  that  have  directly  addressed  social  systems.  Steinbring’s  use  of 
Luhmann’s  sociological  theory  was  described  above.  Here  I  will  describe 
Davis’s use of complexity theory.  
Davis and colleagues (Davis & Sumara 1997, 2006; Davis & Simmt 2003) use 
complexity  theory  to  extend  enactivism  to  social  systems,  as  well  as  other 
complex systems.  
Enactivism understands the individual to be part of—that is, embedded in and 
a subsystem to—a series of increasingly complex systems with integrities of their 
own, including classroom groupings, schools, communities, cultures, humanity The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research 
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and the biosphere. The notion of “embodied knowledge” extends to bodies much 
larger than our own. (Davis 1996:193) 
This  approach  extends  the  types  of  systems  it  can  address,  at  the  cost  of 
treating them all as complex systems. Complex systems have many important 
properties, but far fewer than the living systems that enactivism focusses on. 
This  limits  the  body  of  concepts  that  can  be  brought  into  the  analysis  of 
phenomena  in  mathematics  education.  It  also  risks  extending  concepts 
applicable  to  autopoietic  systems,  like  embodiment,  to  complex  systems  in 
general, as is done in the quote above. There is no reason to believe that this 
can be  done  without  diluting  or destroying  the  concepts.  “Using  a  concept 
outside its proper context of application means committing a double fault: the 
concept  will  work  properly  neither  in  the  original  nor  the  new  domain” 
(Maturana & Poerksen 2007: 70)  
Enactivism  has  as  its  main  focus  living  systems,  and  so  it  is  much  more 
restricted than complexity theory. However, there is no need to begin with the 
common  properties  of  all  complex  systems  in  an  effort  to  address  social 
phenomena. Maturana himself showed how enactivism ideas can be extended 
to social systems, and more importantly which ideas can be extended to social 
systems. Maturana rejected the idea of extending ideas such as autopoiesis, 
that had been developed in relation to living systems, to social systems without 
first  establishing  what  the  characteristics  of  social  systems  are.  Hence  he 
begins  a  paper  presented  to  a  symposium  on  “the  theory  of  autopoietic 
systems  as  a  new  foundation  of  the  social  sciences”  (Maturana  1980b)  by 
describing what he sees as the organisation of a social system:  
I propose that a collection of interacting living systems that, in the realization of 
their autopoiesis through the actual operation of their properties as autopoietic 
unities,  constitute  a  system  that  as  a  network  of  interactions  and  relations 
operates  with  respect  to  them  as  a  medium  in  which  they  realize  their 
autopoiesis  while  integrating  it,  is  indistinguishable,  from  a  natural  social 
systems and is, in fact, one such system. (Maturana 1980b:12)  
This definition of social organisation has not been adopted by mathematics 
educators and is only referred to briefly by a few radical constructivists. It is 
also problematic (see below) but it cannot be said that enactivism lacks a way 
to describe social systems.  
Enactivism  provides  a  grand  theory  that  is  sufficient  to  address  both  the 
individual  and  the  social  in  mathematics  education.  It  does  so  without 
juxtaposing  incompatible  frameworks  or  limiting  itself  to  over  general 
descriptions.  But  it  will  not  become  the  dominant  grand  theory  in 
mathematics education, simply because of the way theories become dominant 
in domains with horizontal knowledge structures. And there remain aspects 
of mathematics education that enactivism does not address, most notably the AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
153 
 
nature  and  growth  of  mathematics  itself.  Other  theories  must  be  used  to 
address this aspect.  
With  the  ability  to  address  a  wide  range  of  phenomena  with  a  single 
framework comes the risk of incoherence, and in the next section I will turn to 
the  question  of  coherence,  using  my  case  study  of  mathematics  education 
research to focus the discussion around the nature of autopoietic systems and 
social systems. 
 
Is Enactivism Coherent in General? 
My case study of enactivism in mathematics education suggests that a possible 
source  of  incoherencies  is  the  description  of  systems  using  inappropriate 
terminology. There is a need to be able to describe social systems in particular, 
and because social systems are like living systems in some ways, there have 
been  efforts  to  apply  Maturana’s  and  Varela’s  concepts  to  them.  However, 
unless care  is  taken  to  establish  the  nature of  social systems first, there  is 
a  danger of misapplying enactivist concepts. Maturana and Varela describe 
features of  living systems, without  usually  indicating which  of  the features 
arise only because the systems are living, and which might apply also to non-
living  systems.  To  clarify  my  discussion  of  these  points  I  will  begin  by 
reviewing the properties of autopoietic systems, which are often given in an 
abbreviated form that makes it too easy to over generalise the concept. I will 
then propose a nesting of types of systems and locate living systems, cognitive 
systems  and  social  systems  in  it.  Through  a  discussion of  the properties of 
these  types  of  systems,  I  will  locate  possible  sources  of  incoherence  in 
enactivism and address them. 
 
Autopoietic systems 
It is helpful to be precise about how exactly Maturana and Varela characterise 
autopoietic systems. Autopoietic systems have a number of properties, all of 
which must be present for them to be autopoietic. These are the following.  
A.  Autopoietic  systems  are  self-producing.  They  create  their  own 
components. “The relations that characterize autopoiesis are relations 
of productions of components” (Varela 1979: 54). 
B. Autopoietic systems are embodied. They create a boundary between 
themselves  and  everything  else.  “It  is  a  defining  feature  of  an 
autopoietic system that it should specify its own boundaries” (Varela 
1979: 54). 
C.  Autopoietic  systems  are  self-organising.  The  processes  or  inter-
actions between components are organised into a recursive network The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research 
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that  (re)generates  itself.  “Autopoietic  systems  ...  have  their  own 
organization  as  the  critical  fundamental  variable  that  they  actively 
maintain constant.” (Maturana 1975: 318) 
D. Autopoietic systems are composite unities. They are distinguished 
both as entities and also as networks of interacting components. 
E.  Autopoietic  systems  are  interactionally  open.  “Every  system  will 
maintain  endless  interactions  with  the  environment  which  will 
impinge  and  perturb  it.  If  this  were  not  so,  we  could  not  even 
distinguish  it.”  (Varela  &  Goguen  1978:  294,  original  empha-
sis removed).  
F.  Autopoietic  systems  are  mechanistic.  Their  “organization  is 
specifiable only in terms of relations between processes generated by 
the interactions of components, and not by spatial relations between 
these components.” (Varela, Maturana & Uribe 1974: 188). Mechanistic 
systems are structure determined. “A structure determined system is 
a system such that all that takes place in it, or happens to it at any 
instant,  is  determined  by  its  structure  at  that  instant”  (Maturana 
2002:15).  
Properties A and B distinguish autopoietic systems from other autonomous 
systems,  and  hence  are  especially  important.  However,  they  are  not  by 
themselves  sufficient,  and  focussing  on  those  two  properties  would  mean 
ignoring important properties that autopoietic systems have in common with 
other self-organising systems.  
Properties C and D together define organisational closure, the distinguishing 
property of autonomous systems.  
An organizationally closed unity is defined as a composite unity by a network of 
interactions  of  components  that  (i)  through  their  interactions  recursively 
regenerate the network of interactions that produced them, and (ii) realize the 
network as a unity in the space in which the components exist by constituting 
and specifying the unity’s boundaries as a cleavage from the background (Varela 
1981:15) 
The distinction between properties A and B, and properties C and D is not 
always  understood,  and  this  results  in  the  misapplication  of  the  label 
‘autopoietic’ to autonomous systems that are not autopoietic. “The distinction 
between autopoiesis as proper to the unitary character of living organisms in 
the  physical  space,  and  autonomy  as  a  general  phenomenon  applicable  in 
other  spaces  of  interactions,  has  been  consistently  confused  and  left 
unclarified” (Varela 1981:14). Autonomous systems have properties C and D 
but not properties A and B.  AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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Property A (self-production) and property C (self-organisation) both concern 
the  generative  capacity  of  the  network  of  interactions  in  the  system.  Self-
production  concerns  the  production  of  the  system’s  components.  Self-
organisation  concerns  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  the  network  of 
interactions  between  those  components.  Neither  implies  the  other. 
Autocatalytic  systems  create  their  own  components,  and  so  they  are  self-
producing, but they do not maintain the organisation that allows them to do 
so, so they are not self-organising (Maturana & Varela 1980: 94). Varela (1979) 
describes the immune system as an example of an autonomous system, i.e., 
a system with properties C and D, but its components are produced outside the 
system so it is not autopoietic.  
Property B (embodiment) and property D (unity) both concern the boundary 
between  the  system  and  its  medium.  However  embodiment  refers  to  the 
production by the system of its boundary which is made of components of the 
system, while unity refers to the way the system is perceived by an observer, 
as being both a unity as well as a network of interacting components. The 
immune  system  is  seen  as  a  system,  as  a  unity,  as  well  as  being  seen  as 
composed of components that interact. But it does not produce a boundary in 
the  space of  its  components,  which are cells. “The  immune system defines 
a boundary  not  in  a  topological  sense,  but  rather  in  a  space  of  molecular 
configurations,  by  specifying  what  shapes  can  enter  into  the  ongoing 
interactions of the system at every point in time” (Varela 1981:18).  
The boundary between the system and its medium is also related to property E 
(interactional openness). A boundary both marks the extent of a system, as 
well  as  providing  the  means  by  which  it  interacts  with  its  medium.  The 
importance of interactions between the system and its medium through its 
boundary  is  indicated by  this  recent  definition of autopoiesis:  “A system  is 
autopoietic  if:  (a)  it  has  a  semi-permeable  boundary,  (b)  the  boundary  is 
produced  from  within  the  system,  and  (c)  it  encompasses  reactions  that 
regenerate the components of the system.” (Varela 2000, in Bourgine & Stewart 
2004:  329).  A  system  that  did  not  interact  with  its  medium  would  be 
unobservable, and in addition, would not last long as it would have no way to 
import energy to offset entropy.  
Property F (mechanistic) places autopoietic systems among dynamic systems, 
which  are  defined  by  recursive  properties  rather  than  by  geometric 
characteristics, which can also give rise to emergent properties (as is the case 
in crystals). This property is also a reminder that autopoiesis is a non-vitalist 
description of life. Being alive comes from recursive properties of the system 
rather than the presence of a vital spark or substance.  
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Nesting of types of systems 
Of the properties of autopoietic systems listed above, property E must be the 
most general. If a unity is not open to interactions with an observer, it cannot 
be observed. All the other properties can only apply to observable unities. This 
is  because  properties  are  not  properties  of  the  unity  but  properties  of  the 
observer’s interactions with it.  
The basic cognitive operation that we perform as observers is the operation of 
distinction. By means of this operation we specify a unity as an entity distinct 
from a background, characterize both unity and background with the properties 
with  which  this  operation  endows  them,  and  specify  their  separability. 
(Maturana & Varela 1980: xix) 
Property D distinguishes composite unities from simple unities.  
 A  unity  thus  specified  [by  an  operation of  distinction]  is  a  simple unity  that 
defines through its properties the space in which it exists and the phenomenal 
domain  which  it  may  generate  in  its  interactions  with  other  unities.  If  we 
recursively apply the operation of distinction to a unity, so that we distinguish 
components in it; we respecify it as a composite unity that exists in the space that 
its  components  define  because  it  is  through  the  specified  properties  of  its 
components that we observers distinguish it. Yet we can always treat a composite 
unity as a simple unity that does not exist in the space of its components, but 
which exists in a space that it defines through the properties that characterize it 
as a simple unity. (Maturana & Varela 1980: xix) 
Some unities can only be observed as simple unities. Which unities are simple 
depends on the observer of course. In my case, given a sphere of clear crystal 
I observe it as a simple unity. Other observers say that the crystal ball has 
components, atoms in a particular configuration, but I do not observe those 
components, so it is a simple unity for me. Composite unities can be observed 
in two ways, either as a simple unity or as a set of components. Varela (1979) 
calls these two ways of observing the ‘behavioural view’ and the ‘recursive 
view’ respectively. Maturana and Varela use the word ‘system’ to refer only to 
composite  unities  observed  recursively,  which  is  a  narrower  usage  than  is 
common  is  systems  theory  generally,  and  which  can  lead  to  seeming 
incoherencies.  
Property B can apply to both simple unities and composite unities. I observe 
the crystal ball as having a topological boundary between it and not-it. I can 
also observe through a microscope the topological boundary between a cell 
and  its  medium.  Because  the  cell  is  a  component  entity,  I  can  observe  its 
boundary  in  two  ways,  either  as  an  edge  between  it  and  not-it,  or  as 
a component of the cell itself.  
Within  composite  unities  we  can  distinguish  between  static  unities  and 
dynamic or mechanistic unities. A static unity is distinguished by the spatial 
relations  between  its  components.  As  an  observer  I  distinguish  a  table  as AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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a simple unity by the interactions I can have with it, and as a composite unity 
by  the  way  its  parts  are  put  together.  A  dynamic  or  mechanistic  unity  is 
distinguished  by  the  “relations  between  processes  generated  by  the 
interactions of components” (Varela, Maturana & Uribe 1974: 188). The spacial 
relations between the components of a mechanistic unity are not fixed, but its 
components interact in ways that define its organisation.  
Finally,  I  discussed above autonomous systems and  self-producing systems. 
These are overlapping subtypes of mechanistic systems. Autopoietic systems 
are located in the intersection of autonomous systems, self-producing systems 
and embodied unities (See Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Nested types of systems 
 
 
Having identified the key properties of autopoietic systems and having shown 
how they are nested, I will now turn to some specific systems of interest: living 
systems, cognitive systems and social systems, and discuss where they fit into 
the nesting of properties. 
 
Living systems 
A  question  that  has  been  discussed  a  great  length  is  whether  or  not  the 
categories ‘living system’ and ‘autopoietic system’ are identical. Maturana and 
Varela  initially  coined the term ‘autopoiesis’  in  order  to  characterise  living 
systems, and claimed “autopoiesis is necessary and sufficient to characterize 
the organization of living systems” (1980:82). This suggests that all autopoietic 
systems are living systems and all living systems are autopoietic. However, as The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research 
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soon as the word was defined, it began to be applied to systems that are not 
usually thought of as living, including social systems. Maturana and Varela 
may have contributed to this confusion themselves by describing a computer 
model as autopoietic (Varela, Maturana & Uribe 1974, Varela 1979).  
If  autopoiesis  is  not  sufficient  to  characterise  living  systems,  what  else  is 
required?  Maturana  clarifies  “An  autopoietic  system  that  exists  in  physical 
space is a living system (or, more correctly, the physical space is the space that 
the components of living systems specify and in which they exist)” (1978a: 36). 
Computer models do not exist in physical space, and so are not alive. What 
exactly is physical space? “The physical space is defined by components that 
can  be  determined  by  operations  that  characterize  them  in  terms  of  pro-
perties such as masses, forces, accelerations, distances, fields, etc.” (Maturana 
& Varela 1980: 112).  
Another characterisation is that living systems are autopoietic systems whose 
components  are  molecules.  In  fact,  this  requirement  of  having  molecular 
components came before the word ‘autopoiesis’ was coined.  
At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1964  I  began  to  say  that  living  systems  were 
constituted  as  unities  or  discrete  entities  as  circular  closed  dynamics  of 
molecular  productions open  to  the  flow of  molecules through  them  in which 
everything  could  change  except  their  closed  circular  dynamics  of  molecular 
productions. (Maturana 2002: 8)  
Maturana  goes  on  to  say  “I  also  claim  that  autopoiesis  occurs  only  in  the 
molecular domain” (Maturana 2002: 8). At one point he did think it “possible 
that autopoietic systems could exist in domains different from the molecular 
one” (Maturana 2002: 14) however, he later came to see the molecular domain 
as having unique properties necessary for autopoiesis.  
Molecules through their interactions give rise to molecules and dynamic systems 
of  molecular  productions,  in  diffuse  and  localized  processes  that  constitute 
discrete entities. I think that due to this peculiarity of the molecular domain this 
is  the  only  domain  in  which  autopoietic  systems  can  take  place  as  discrete 
singular  systems  that  operate  through  thermal  agitation  and  dynamic 
architecture. (Maturana 2002: 8)  
This seems to be a claim that could be empirically tested. In the cybernetic 
tradition, whether or not a system is autopoietic ought to be a matter of the 
system’s  organisation,  independent  of  the  nature  of  its  components.  “The 
actual nature of the components, and the particular properties that these may 
possess other than those participating in the interactions and transformations 
which  constitute  the  system,  are  irrelevant  and  can  be  any”  (Maturana 
& Varela 1980: 77). This leaves open the possibility that there might be non-
living,  non-molecular  autopoietic  systems.  Of  course,  Maturana  has  every 
right to narrow the meaning of ‘autopoiesis’ to apply only to living, molecular 
systems, making autopoiesis a matter not only of organisation but also of the AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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type of components involved. This would only mean that another word would 
be  required to  describe  systems  that  have  the  same  organisation  as  living, 
molecular  systems,  but  are  made  of  non-molecular  components.  While 
I sympathise  with  Maturana’s  fears  that  the  concept  of  autopoiesis  could 
become useless if it becomes ill defined or over-applied, there seems to me to 
be some value in describing living systems as molecular autopoietic systems, 
leaving open the possibility that autopoietic systems could be created from 
other components. I would agree with Varela: 
The  relations  that  characterize  autopoiesis  are  relations  of  productions  of 
components. ... Given this notion of production of components, it follows that the 
cases  of  autopoiesis  we  can  actually  exhibit,  such  as  living  systems  or  the 
example  described  in  Varela  et  al.  (1974),  have  as  a  criteria  of  distinction 
a topological boundary, and the processes that define them occur in a physical-
like space, actual or simulated in a computer. (Varela 1981:15) 
Computer models can be autopoietic in a “physical-like space.” While Varela’s 
original model has been critiqued (on the basis that it included a component, 
a catalyst, that it cannot produce, Bourgine & Stewart 2004) efforts continue to 
produce  computer  models  that  have  all  the  properties  of  an  autopoietic 
system, within the space they define. In other words, I would argue that living 
systems are located entirely in the intersection of autonomous systems, self-
producing systems and embodied unities (see Figure 2) but that they do not fill 
it. There could be autopoietic systems that are non-living.  
 
Cognitive systems 
Enactivism is a theory of cognition, in which cognition is seen as a property of 
all living systems, which are defined as autopoietic systems.  
A  cognitive  system  is  a  system  whose  organization  defines  a  domain  of 
interactions in which it can act with relevance to the maintenance of itself, and 
the  process  of  cognition  is  the  actual  (inductive)  acting  or  behaving  in  the 
domain. Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process 
of  cognition.  This  statement  is  valid  for  all  organisms,  with  and  without 
a nervous system. (Maturana 1980a: 13).  
Succinctly,  cognition  is  “effective  behavior  in a medium” (Maturana  1978b: 
37). What types of systems can behave effectively in a medium? Living systems 
certainly can, and it is the embedding of learning and cognition in a general 
study of life that makes enactivism distinctive. But living systems are not the 
only systems that define a domain of interactions in which they can act with 
relevance to the maintenance of themselves. All that is required is that the 
system engage in maintaining itself, and that true of autonomous systems in 
general. “The mechanisms of identity of an autonomous system correlate with 
the establishment of cognitive interactions with its environment” (Varela 1979: 
211).  Varela  gives  as  two  examples  the  nervous  system  and  the  immune The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research 
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system,  but  he  also  discusses  cognitive  social  systems,  including  transient 
interactions like conversations. 
Every  autonomous  structure  will  exhibit  a  cognitive  domain  and  behave  as 
a separate, distinct aggregate. Such autonomous units can be constituted by any 
processes  capable  of  engaging  in  organizational  closure.  whether  molecular 
interactions, managerial manipulations, or conversational participation.... I am 
saying, then, that whenever we engage in social interactions that we label as 
dialogue or conversation, these constitute autonomous aggregates, which exhibit 
all the properties of other autonomous units. (Varela 1979: 269)  
This broadening of the meaning of cognition is useful in educational research, 
where  a  focus  on  organisms  with  nervous  systems,  especially  people,  can 
obscure fundamental issues such as the role of structural coupling in learning. 
Research on learning and cognition is not restricted to human learning and 
cognition,  or  even  the  cognition  of  living  systems.  Cognitive  systems  are 
located in and coincide with autonomous systems (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Cognitive and living systems 
 
 
Social systems 
If  there  is  an  area  where  enactivism  is  incoherent,  it  may  well  be  in  the 
treatment of social systems. This is perhaps not surprising, as Maturana and 
Varela specialised in the study of living systems, and their comments on social 
systems did not rest on the same level of expertise. In addition, if one assumes 
that  the  components  of  social  systems  are  living  systems,  as  they  did,  and 
therefore that the components of human social systems are human beings, 
then one is limited in the type of observations that are possible.  AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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Nothing  prevents  the  observer  himself  from  being  part  of  the  process  of 
specifying the system, not only by describing it, but by being one link in the 
network of processes that defines the system. This situation is peculiar in that 
the describer cannot step outside of the unity to consider its boundaries and 
environment  simultaneously,  but  it  is  associated  with  the  unity’s  functioning 
always  as  a  determining  component.  Such  situations,  to  which  most  of  the 
autonomous social systems belong, are characterized by a dynamics in which the 
very description of the system makes the system different. At each stage, the 
observer  relates  to  the  system  through  an  understanding  which  modifies  his 
relationship to the system. This is, properly speaking, the hermeneutic circle of 
interpretation-action, on which all human activity is based. (Varela 1981: 16) 
Human beings observing human social systems are limited in two ways. First, 
they cannot take a behavioural view on the system, seeing it a simple unity, 
stepping “outside of the unity to consider its boundaries and environment”. 
Human  observers  of  human  social  systems  are  always  components  of  the 
system  or  its  environment  and  can  only  observe  it  with  a  recursive  view, 
focussed  on  its  components  and  the  interactions  between  them.  Second, 
describing a social system is a way of interacting with its components, in a way 
that describing a cell is not: “The very description of the system makes the 
system different.” Given these challenges it is not surprising that Maturana 
and Varela had some difficulties describing social systems.  
However, there are some points about which they are clear and consistent. 
First,  that  integrating  social  systems  into  enactivism  must  begin  by 
understanding  social  phenomena  independently  of  enactivist  concepts  and 
terminology. Second, that the components of social systems are living systems. 
And third, that social systems are not autopoietic.  
Maturana begins his 1980 essay ‘Man and society’ by asking “What is a social 
system?” (1980b: 11) and giving as the criterion for judging an answer to this 
question comparison to “the same phenomena that a natural social system 
appears  to  generate  in  its  operation”  (1980b:  11).  In  other  words,  before 
proposing an answer to the question “What is a social system?” it is necessary 
to observe social phenomena. Maturana saw this as a fundamental problem in 
Luhmann’s use of the concept of autopoiesis.  
I  suggest  that  we  start  with  the  question  of  the  characteristics  of  social 
phenomena.  The  concept  of  society  historically  precedes  the  idea  of  the 
autopoiesis  of  living  systems.  Society  was  the  primary  subject  of  debate; 
autopoiesis and social systems came much later. It follows, therefore, that we 
should first deal with all the relevant phenomena appearing in the analyses of 
society and only afterwards ask ourselves whether they may be elucidated more 
precisely in terms of the concept of autopoiesis. (Maturana & Poerksen 2007: 70)  
Another  disagreement  Maturana  had  with  Luhmann  concerned  the 
components  of  social  systems.  Luhmann  proposed  that  the  components  of 
a social system are communications and that human beings form a part of the The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research 
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medium in which the social system exists. Maturana rejected this position: 
“When  we  speak  about  social  systems  in  our  everyday  life,  however,  we 
naturally  have  in  mind  all  the  individuals  with  their  peculiar  properties” 
(Maturana & Poerksen 2007: 71). “A social system can only be integrated by 
living systems” (Maturana 1980: 13). Maturana’s clearest definition of a social 
system starts with living systems: 
[A  social  system  is]  a  collection  of  interacting  living  systems  that,  in  the 
realization of their autopoiesis through the actual operation of their properties 
as autopoietic unities, constitute a system that as a network of interactions and 
relations operates with respect to them as a medium in which they realize their 
autopoiesis while integrating it. (Maturana 1980b: 11-12) 
Although Maturana and Varela could not agree completely on how to treat 
social systems (Maturana & Varela 1980: xxiv), Varela also assumes that the 
components of human social systems are human beings, as indicated in his 
remark about autonomous social systems quoted above (Varela 1981: 16).  
Both Maturana and Varela are clear that they do not see social systems as 
autopoietic. Social systems can be autonomous (i.e., they have properties C-F) 
but  social  systems  do  not  have  boundaries  and  do  not  produce  their 
components.  
There have been proposals suggesting that certain human systems, such as an 
institution, should be understood as autopoietic (Beer 1975; Zeleny and Pierre 
1976).  From  what  I  have  said  I  believe  that  these  proposals  are  category 
mistakes: they confuse autopoiesis with autonomy. (Varela 1981: 15) 
However,  Maturana  occasionally  makes  comments  that  makes  this  point 
less  clear.  
Just  imagine for  a moment  a social system  that  is,  in actual  fact,  functioning 
autopoietically.  It  would  be  an  autopoietic  system  of  the  third  order,  itself 
composed  of  autopoietic  systems  of  the  second  order.  This  would  entail  that 
every  single  process  taking  place  within  this  system  would  necessarily  be 
subservient to the maintenance of the autopoiesis of the whole. Consequently, 
the individuals with all their peculiarities and diverse forms of self-presentation 
would vanish. They would have to subordinate themselves to the maintenance of 
autopoiesis. Their fate is of no further relevance. They must conform in order to 
preserve the identity of the system. This kind of negation of the individual is 
among the characteristics of totalitarian systems. Stalin, therefore, forced party 
members who did not share his outlook to give up their positions so as not to 
endanger  the  cohesion  and  the  unity  of  the  party.  In  a  democratic  form  of 
communal  life,  however,  individuals  are  of  central  relevance  and,  in  fact, 
indispensable. Their properties create the unique character of a social system. 
(Maturana & Poerksen 2007: 72)  
For Maturana, a social system is “a medium in which [living systems] realize 
their  autopoiesis”  (Maturana  1980b:  12),  which  means  he  must  reject  any 
system that interferes with the autopoiesis of the living systems in it. But as he AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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notes,  totalitarian  systems  do  precisely  this.  By  Maturana’s  definition, 
totalitarian systems are not social systems. “A social system that forbids and 
even principally excludes complaint and protest is not a social system. It is 
a system of tyranny.” (Maturana & Poerksen 2007: 72). Given that Maturana 
developed his definition of a social system while in exile from Pinochet’s Chile, 
he may have had reasons to characterise social systems in the way he did. 
However,  it  is  not  only  totalitarian  systems  that  are  excluded  by  Matu-
rana’s definition.  
A  person who works  for  a  given  society  and who cannot stop working for  it 
without  risking  the loss  of his autopoiesis  because he has no  other means of 
survival  outside  this  work-relation,  is  under  social  abuse.  Example:  In 
a capitalistic  economic  system  a  worker  is  not  a  member  of  the  productive 
society through which he earns his living and, therefore, only works for it. If, 
under these circumstances, there is no employment with respect to his abilities, 
and if he has no other independent means of survival, he is under social abuse. 
Such a person cannot enter into a work-agreement on terms generated by the 
fundamental  equality  that  permits  cooperation,  and  must  surrender  his 
autonomy as a human being in order to survive. (Maturana 1980b: 18) 
Armies,  police  departments,  fire  departments  and  other  organisations  that 
subsume their members’ autopoiesis to the goals of the organisation are also 
excluded  by  Maturana’s  definition  of  a  social  system.  However,  Maturana 
states that “In general any organism, and in particular any human being, can 
be simultaneously a member of many social systems, such as a family, a club, 
an army, a political party, a religion or a nation, and can operate in one or 
other without necessarily being in internal contradiction” (Maturana & Varela 
1980: xxviii). It is not at all clear that armies, religions and nations are systems 
that support the autopoiesis of their component human beings. And armies, 
religions  and  nations  routinely  restrict  complaint  and  protest.  Perhaps 
Maturana did not mean to include all religions and nations as social systems, 
but it is hard to imagine any army that would fit his definition of a social 
system.  
A further aspect of Maturana’s definition of a social system is the role of love 
in constituting a human social system.  
What  determines  the  constitution  of  a  social  system  are  the  recurrent 
interactions  of  the  same  autopoietic  systems.  In  other  words,  any  biological 
stabilization  of  the  structures of  the  interacting  organisms  that results  in  the 
recurrence of their interactions, may generate a social system. Among human 
beings the basic stabilizing factor in the constitution of a social system is the 
phenomenon of  love,  the  seeing  of  the other  as  a  partner  in  some  or  all  the 
dimensions of living. (Maturana & Varela 1980: xxvi) 
It may be that Maturana has in mind an ideal human society, rather than any 
actual human society.  The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research 
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A human society in which to see all human beings as equivalent to oneself, and 
to love them, is operationally legitimate without demanding from them a larger 
surrender of individuality and autonomy than the measure that one is willing to 
accept for oneself while integrating it as an observer, is a product of human art, 
that is, an artificial society that admits change and accepts every human being as 
not dispensable. (Maturana & Varela 1980: xxix) 
If we accept Maturana’s definition of social system, then we require another 
word  for  those  composite  unities  that  most  people  consider  to  be  social 
systems: families, clubs, armies, political parties, religions, nations, etc. Either 
that  or  we  need  another  definition  of  ‘social  system’  in  enactivist  terms. 
Because  Maturana’s  definition  of  a  social  system  is  problematic,  and  was 
never  accepted  by  Varela,  enactivism  lacks  a  coherent  definition  of  ‘social 
system’ derived from primary sources. This has left the field open to many 
proposals  of  alternative  definitions,  from  Beer  (1980)  to  Zeleny  (Zeleny  & 
Hufford  1991).  This host  of alternatives makes  it  impossible  to place  social 
systems definitively in the nesting of types of systems depicted in Figure 1. 
Social systems may or may not be autopoietic, but there seems to be a general 
agreement that they are at least autonomous, and so have many interesting 
properties.  
 
Conclusion 
To conclude I will reiterate a few of the main points I have made above. First, 
in mathematics education research enactivism offers a ‘grand theory’ that can 
be  brought  to  bear  on  most  of  the  phenomena  of  interest  to  mathematics 
educators.  It  has  particular  strength  in  describing  interactions  between 
cognitive systems, including human beings, human conversations and larger 
human social systems. Much remains to be done in exploring the potential of 
enactivism  for  social  cognition.  Second,  some  apparent  incoherencies  of 
enactivism  come  from  the  adoption,  in  mathematics  education  but  also  in 
other fields, of parts of enactivism which are then grafted onto incompatible 
theories. This opens up enactivism to critiques from both within mathematics 
education  and  outside  the  field.  Most  strongly,  in  my  opinion,  theories  of 
cognition  that  claims  to  be  enactivist,  but  rely  only  on  the  philosophical 
arguments  introduced  in  The  Embodied  Mind  rather  than  the  biological 
arguments presented in Autopoiesis and Cognition, leave enactivism open to 
philosophical  critiques.  This  is  one  reason  for  my  insistence  on  referring 
primarily  to  Maturana’s  work  in  defining  enactivist  concepts.  Third,  and 
finally,  a  source  of  incoherence  is  the  lack  of  a  generally  agreed  upon 
definition  of  a  social  system.  There  is  no  reason  why  a  suitable  definition 
cannot be found, and I suspect replacing Maturana’s ‘love’ with something like 
a shared emotional orientation (Maturana 1988) would be sufficient, but this 
remains to be done.  AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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